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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
COMMUNITY PROPERTY: THE EFFECT OF PERSONAL
INJURY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN SPOUSES
By KENNETH SKOUSEN
The recent case of Kesler v Pabst' has added a new page in California
legal history The Supreme Court held that even where a husband released
his interest in a community cause of action to his wife, she would be barred
by his contributory negligence in a suit against the defendant. Just why
the court would not give effect to his attempt to make the cause of action
her separate property can only be understood in the light of California law
as interpreted by the courts.
A. Causes of Action.
The California rule, in the absence of agreement between the spouses,
is that a cause of action for personal injuries is community property 2 The
basis for this rule is that the community property laws of California pro-
vide that all property acquired by the spouses during marriage, other than
by gift, devise, bequest, or descent, is community 3 The courts reason that
if damages for personal injuries are acquired during marriage and not in
the four prescribed ways, they must be community The logical basis for
this rule is that where the earning power of either spouse has been de-
creased by an injury, then to that extent, the community has been injured.
The courts look at the marriage as a matrimonial partnership whereby
each spouse contributes to the common benefit of the unit.4
DeFumak points out that when the wife has been injured, both the
marital community and the wife as an individual are injured. He reasons.
"The only logical conclusion, therefore, is that a personal injury to a
spouse, or for that matter an injury to reputation, or the like, may give rise
to a cause of action in the injured spouse and also in the marital commu-
nity 5
The Legislature in 1951 provided a new section to the California Civil Code
which adds new weight to the majority view Section 17 1c provides:
cc subject to Sections 164 and 169 of this code, the wife has the man-
agement, control, and disposition of community property money earned
by her or community property money damages received by her for her per-
sonal injuries suffered by her, This section shall not be construed as
making such money the separate property of the wife, nor as changing the
1 Kesler v. Pabst, 43 A.C. 256, 273 P.2d 257 (1954).
2 Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949), see Franklin v Franklin, 71 Cal.
App.2d 717, 155 P.2d 637 (1945), which held that the cause of action was not community
but the amount recovered would be. The case was disapproved by Zaxagosa v Craven, supra.
3 CALIF. CIV. CODE §§ 162, 163, 164.
4 DE FUNIAK, PINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 231 (1943).
5 Id. at 230.
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respective interests of the husband and wife in such money, as defined in
Section 161a of this code."8
This section shows that DeFuniak's view is not gaining much ground.
Logically the statute should be amended to provide two causes of ac-
tion: one to the injured spouse for pain, suffering, and disfigurement, and
the other to the community for future loss of services. It is the person in-
jured whose body suffers the pain for which compensation is made, while
the community suffers when that person cannot contribute to the marital
partnership.
B. Imputed Contributory Negligence.
The trend of authority in common law jurisdictions is not to impute the
negligence of one individual to his spouse in suits against third persons.'
This rule is looked upon with favor in such community property states
as Nevada, New Mexico, and Louisiana.! California, however, treats the
cause of action as well as the damages as community, and holds that con-
tributory negligence of one spouse bars the other. The reason given for
arriving at this conclusion is that a failure to impute the negligence of one
spouse to the other allows the negligent spouse to profit by his own wrongY
New Mexico, Nevada, and Louisiana hold that recovery of damages for
personal injuries belong to the person injured."0 In these states the spouse
cannot bar the innocent spouse because the recovery is not considered com-
munity property.
As long as California continues to hold to the view that the recovery is
community, a negligent spouse will be profiting by his own wrong if recov-
ery by the other is allowed. Because of this California view several ques-
tions arise. What is the effect of the rule where the negligent spouse dies
in the accident from which the cause of action has arisen? What is the effect
if the husband and wife are divorced after the cause of action has arisen?
What is the effect, if either before or after the cause of action has arisen,
the spouses agree that a recovery for personal injuries by either shall be
his or her separate property?
C. Effect of Death and Divorce.
Since the leading California case of Flores v. Brown," ifthe contribu-
torily negligent spouse dies after the cause of action has arisen, the wife
may recover for her personal injuries. In that case Mrs. Flores' husband
and minor son were killed in an accident by a negligent defendant. The
6 CApIF. Civ. CODE § 171c.
7 42 CAT=. L. REv. 487, 488.8 Vitale v. Checker Cab Co., 166 La. 527, 117 So. 579 (1928), Frederickson and'Watson
Const. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940), Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483,
245 P.2d 826 (1952).9 Basler v. Sacramento Gas and Elec. Co., 158 Cal. 514, 111 Pac. 530 (1910), Moody v.
Southern Pac. Co., 167 Cal. 786, 141 Pac. 388 (1914), 10 Cal.Jur.2d 699, 700.10 See note 8 supra.
"Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 631, 632, 248 P.2d 922 (1952).
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defense contended that Mrs. Flores could not recover for her personal in-
juries because the husband's negligence was imputable to her. In answer
to this the court said.
"When the husband is dead, not only m the reason for the rule imputing
negligence to the wife gone, but to apply it defeats its own purpose. It is but
a windfall to a defendant who negligently injures a wife or causes the death
of a minor child that recovery may be barred because the wife's husband
was also negligent. Although allowing the negligent defendant to escape
liability has been considered a lesser evil than allowing the negligent spouse
to profit from his own wrong, surely the former evil may not be balanced
by the latter when the latter is no longer present.112
From the decision in the Flores case it is clear that the Supreme Court
of California is in favor of letting the non-negligent spouse recover when
there is no possible chance that the husband will be enriched. The result
seems just in view of the fact that the defendant has been negligent. No
possible benefit can come to the negligent spouse through a recovery by his
non-negligent wife.
Where the marriage is dissolved by divorce after the cause of action
has arisen, the Flores case should be applied. The divorce dissolves the mar-
riage and the husband has no opportunity to profit from his own wrong.
Hence, the wife should be allowed to recover.
D. Agreements betzveen the Spouses.
In California, a husband and wife may enter into contracts involving
present and future interests.' 3 Since Perkins v Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co., 4
a husband may relinquish his interest in a community cause of action for
personal injuries either before or after the cause of action arises. It would
therefore seem to follow that the imputed negligence rule as between
spouses would not apply when the negligent spouse had given up his right
to the community recovery There is no possibility of his profiting because
all damages would belong to the non-negligent spouse. However, in Kesler
v. Pabst"s the court held that even where the husband released his interest,
his contributory negligence would still be imputed to his wife. In that case
the husband and wife were injured in an auto accident and sued the de-
fendant for personal injuries and property damage. The jury found for the
defendant on the ground that Mr. Kesler was contributorily negligent and
thus recovery was precluded. Mrs. Kesler on appeal did not contest the
finding that her husband was negligent, but maintained that his negligence
should not be imputed to her because he had relinquished any right he had
to recovery by a release. She argued that the reason for the rule was gone
because her husband could no longer be enriched. The District Court of
121d. at 632, 248 P.2d at 927
1 Wren v. Wren, 100 Cal. 276, 34 Pac. 775 (1893), In re Davis, 106 Cal. 453, 39 Pac. 756(1895), Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 160 P.2d 15 (1945), see CAmI. CIV. CODE § 158.
14 Perkins v Sunset Tel. and Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712, 103 Pac. 190 (1909)
15 Kesler v. Pabst, 43 A.C. 256, 273 P.2d 257 (1954).
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Appeals reversed the lower court's decision and held for Mrs. Kesler by
saying:
"We can see no difference between a situation where because of the death
of the husband he no longer has an interest in the recovery and one where
by a relinquishment he no longer has such interest. Had the husband prior
to the accident relinquished all claim to injuries which his wife might re-
ceive should an accident occur, defendant could not raise against her the
defense of imputable negligence of the husband. Defendant should not then
have the benefit of the defense called a 'windfall' m the Flores case, supra,
when at the trial it is found that the husband, so far as interest in the wife's
recovery is concerned, is in the same situation he would have been had he
made a relinqmshment prior to the accident."'1
The Supreme Court of California reversed the Appellate Court's decision
stating:
"Even if it is assumed that such a relinquishment is effective between the
spouses, its execution does not prevent the negligent husband from profiting
by his own wrong. By his act of relinquishment Mr. Kesler sought to exer-
cise control over his interest in the community cause of action and give up
his rights m the recovery The right to dispose of property, however, consti-
tutes a major interest of the owner therein, and if by the exercise of such
right the owner could avoid the effect of his contributory negligence and
thus create an enforceable right m his donee that did not theretofore exist,
he would in fact profit by his own wrong. Accordingly, the objective of pre-
venting unjust enrichment cannot be accomplished by a voluntary relin-
quishment of the negligent husband's interest to his wife.' 71
The Supreme Court distinguished the Flores case from the Kesler, at
least theoretically. The difference between the two, in so far as imputing
the negligence of the husband to the wife, was that by the voluntary act of
relinquishment the husband was considered to have received a benefit, while
the involuntary act of death in the Flores case resulted in no benefit. This
distinction seems artificial. The court in the Kesler case seems to have for-
gotten that the benefit received by the negligent husband must be of such
a nature that to receive it would be a greater evil than the defendant's neg-
ligence. Assuming the husband does receive a benefit, is it great enough to
outweigh the windfall of the defendant? As a practical matter the hus-
band's benefit consists only in receiving an intangible mental satisfaction
by giving his share to his wife. Perhaps behind the reasoning of the Kesler
case was the feeling that even though a formal agreement had been made
between the spouses, the husband would eventually receive some of the
money which the wife recovered. If we accept the reason the court gives, we
reach the conclusion that the court distinguishes the Flores case to suit its
own purpose. Did not Mr. Flores receive a benefit by having his wife re-
cover for her personal injuries? Assuming the spouses are on agreeable
16--C.A , 269 P.2d 651 (1953).
17 43 A.C. 258, 259, 273 P.2d 258, 259.
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terms, it is a benefit for a husband who knows he is going to die to have his
wife compensated for her injuries. We cannot say because he is deceased
that he has not been benefited. The benefit is at least equal to the mental
satisfaction derived by giving up a cause of action through a formal agree-
ment.
Suppose the relinquishment is made before the accident. Would the
court say that the husband was exercising sufficient control to benefit by
his own wrong? The wife could argue that he exercised control over the
future right at a time when he was not negligent. At the time of the acci-
dent the right would be in her. Just what the Supreme Court will do with
this problem remains to be seen.
E. Effect of 171 c of the California Civil Code.
Section 171c of the California Civil Code was cited in the Kesler case
by the plaintiff in order to show a legislative intent to give the wife such
control over her personal injury money that her husband could not benefit
enough to have the imputed negligence rule applied." The court refused
to rule on this section as the cause of action arose before the section was
passed. In effect, 171c gives the wife management, control, and disposition
of community moneys earned by her or received by her for her personal
injuries. The husband has control over enough of the recovery to pay ex-
penses incured by reason of the accident. Mrs. Kesler contended, that be-
cause of the control over the money which she did not have before sec-
tion 171c, her husband no longer benefits sufficient to let the defendant
escape liability It is doubtful that the Supreme Court would agree. The
cause of action is still commumty in which the husband has a one-half
interest. 9 Even though he is not permitted to control the money recovered
during his life time, he will get at least one-half of it at her death. 0 Even-
tually he will take his share and this fact would enable him to profit by his
own negligence.
If the wife were allowed to recover under the statute when the husband
was negligent, disregarding any agreement, the court would be allowing
a greater error than had it sustained the agreement. Under the statute the
husband still has a one-half interest and to that extent he benefits. Under
the agreement he retains no monetary interest whatsoever and his only
benefit is said to be that of relinquishing his right to damages. It would
seem that if the court refused to let a spouse profit by exercising an agree-
ment, they would not allow him to profit by retaining a one-half interest in
the recovery
From the discussion presented here, agreements between spouses after
the accident will be of little value where one of the spouses is contributorily
negligent. There is a slight possibility that agreements before the accident
would be valid. However, the court may invalidate such agreements if be-
181d. at 260, 261, 273 P.2d 259, 260.
19 CALIF. CIV. CODE §§ 161a, 171c.
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hind the reasoning of the Kesler case was the feeling that the husband
would eventually get part of the recovery; or if the court felt the spouses
were trying to get around the contributory negligence of the husband. An
agreement executed before the cause of action arose would be executed for
the same purposes. The court may reason that a relinquishment before the
cause of action is just as much a benefit to the husband because the agree-
ment is of no value to the wife until the cause actually arises. It may reason
that the benefit of the control arises when the accident occurs. At this time
the husband is negligent and both spouses should be barred under the
imputed negligence rule.
20 CALIF. PROB. CODE § 201.
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